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COMMENTS
CoNsTITUTIONAL ·LAw-PRoCEDURAL DuE PRocEss IN CRIMINAL
CASES-ADEQUACY OF REMEDIES IN STATE COURTS TO RAISE THE
OuESTIONs-In recent years the United States Supreme Court has gone .
- far in defining the procedural requirements of due process of law. Be-
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ginning with the first Scottsboro decision 1 many opinions have helped to
define more fully the basic protection afforded an accused person by the
Fourteenth Amendment. Although the complete scope of an accused's
rights is still uncertain, many of them are now clear. The use of a coerced confession,2 the denial of the right of counsel in certain cases,8
the systematic exclusion of members of defenda,nt's race from jury
duty,4' have been considered so contrary to our fundamental concepts
of liberty and justice that they violate the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.5 The struggle to broaden and clarify these
concepts has met with much success. However, with the recognition
of these procedural rights comes an equally important problem of supplying a procedure and tribunal by which they may be vindicated. If
constitutional guarantees of a fair trial are to be more than moral strictures it is essential that a person illegally convicted be given an opportunity for a post-conviction hearing. A right can hardly be considered
worthy of that name unless there is some tribunal that will take cognizance of it. This comment will not attempt to consider the guaran- ·
tees of a fair trial,_but will deal with the remedies available to a person
confined in a state prison in his attempt to secure relief on the ground
of an asserted violation of such guarantees in the conduct of his trial.

A. General Scope of Remedial Procedure
I. Normal remedy. If the question of deprivation of procedural
due process is properly raised in the state trial court, the accused is
then entitled to the ordinary process of appellate review in the state
courts. If the record clearly indicates the federal que.5tion involved,
review may then be had in the United States Supreme Court by writ
of certiorari.6 This procedure will ordinarily be adequate to raise the
constitutional questions.
However, this method of review becomes one merely of academic
interest when the crux of the alleged deprivation of due process is
that the accused was rushed to trial without counsel and in ignorance of
1

Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932).
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921 (1944); Haley v. Ohio, 332
U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302 (1948).
.
3
De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 67 S.Ct. 596 (1947); Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932). Compare Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455,
62 S.Ct. 1252 (1942); Bute v. Illinois, (U.S. 1948) 68 S.Ct. 763.
4
Pierrev. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 59 S.Ct. 536 (1939); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S.
128, 61 S.Ct. 164 (1940). Compare Moore v. New York, (U.S. 1948) 68 S.Ct. 705.
5
See Palko v. Copnecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 58 S.Ct. 149 (1937); Boskey and
Pickering, "Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure," 13 Umv. CHI. L. REV.
266 (1946).
6
Bute v. Illinois, (U.S. 1948) 68 S.Ct. 763; Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 53 S.Ct. 55 (1932); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437 (1927).
2
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his rights. In such a case the accused is securely within the prison walls,
and the time for appeal has usually run before he realizes that his
conviction has failed to conform to our traditional sense of justice.7 In
such a case the prisoner must rely on some extraordinary procedure.
2. Extraordinary remedies. In the great majority of states there
is ample opportunity for the accused to gain a post-conviction hearing.
The form of the remedy may be the. traditional writ of habeas corpus,
writ of error coram nobis, or some modern statutory :remedy.8 When
such a hearing is obtained the petitioner may raise the question of due
process, and if the state courts misconceive the guarantees of the due
process clause, the federal question may be reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari.9 If it is clear that there
is no state remedy afforded, or if the case is one of peculiar urgency,
the accused has a remedy by the writ of habeas corpus in federal
courts. 10

B. Remedies where State Procedure is Not Clear
In contrast to the effective remedies mentioned above, some stat.e
procedures are so burdened by procedural anachronisms, narrow limitations, and judicial ambiguity that it is often difficult to discover the
proper procedure for post-conviction hearing, or whether that procedure is ad<:;quate. When such uncertainty exists the fundamental problem of protecting constitutional rights becomes interwoven with delicate questions of the relation between state and federal courts. The
federal courts, as a matter of policy, have long refrained from interfering with state administration of criminal law until all state remedies have been exhausted. 11 This policy gives rise to a serious problem
where it is difficult to tell when the state remedies have been exhausted.
Henry Hawk, confined in a Nebraska prison, has sought no less than
sixteen times a hearing o_n the merits of his allegation of an unconsti7

This may also preclude the accused from insuring that a record is sufficiently
preserved for appeal by writ of error to the state court. See People v. McElhaney,
394 Ill. 380, 68 N.E. (2d) 715 (1946).
8
The scope of these remedies varies with the state practice. Habeas corpus is
often available to attack collaterally the jurisdiction of the trial court on the basis of
unconstitutional proceedings. Coram nobis is a writ of error from the trial court that
is often used to raise issues of unconstitutional procedure not known to., trial court at
time of the trial. For an unusual coram nobis procedure see Hysler v. Florida, 315
U.S. 41 I at 415, 62 S.Ct. 688 (1942). Michigan's deferred motion for a new trial
was used to raise the question in De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 67 S.Ct. 596
(1947).
9
Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 61 S.Ct. 572 (1941); De Meerleer v.
Michigan, 329 U.S. 663, 67 S.Ct. 596 (1947).
10
Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 at 217, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946).
11
Ex parte Hawk, 321, U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944); Urquhart v. Brown, 205
U.S. 17_9, 27 S.Ct. 459 (1907); Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399, 21 S.Ct. 210 (1900).
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tutional trial, and, although the United ?tates Supreme Court has once
remanded his cause and ordered a hearing,12 he is still conducting a vain
search for the proper procedure and tribunal. What the proper procedure is, the Nebraska Supreme Court has been unwilling to say, and
a federal district judge has been unable to ascertain.,_13 In Illinois the
procedural difficulties appear to be even more confusing. The status
of habeas corpus in Illinois is very uncertain. The Illinois Supreme
Court has stated that its denials of petitions for the writ were based on
the fact that habeas corpus is available only for an attack on the jurisdiction of the court over the person and the subject matter.14 That such
a limitation exists on habeas corpus originally brought in Illinois circuit
courts has been the basis of denials of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court.15 The motion in the nature of a writ of error coram
nobis in Illinois is supposedly the complement of habeas corpus, and is
often said to be the remedy the petitioner should have tried.16 But it
appears to be limited in application, and is made unavailable in many
cases by a five year statute of limitations.17 In the recent case of Marino
v. Ragen,18 Marino's application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied
by the state circuit court. Upon certiorari to the United States Supreme Court the attorney general of Illinois, representing Ragen, the
nominal respondent, conceded error in that Marino had sought and
been denied the appropriate remedy in the state court. The attorney
general's view of the Illinois law appeared to be that habeas corpus
was proper to raise a question of deprivation of due process within the
knowledge of the trial judge at the time of the trial. Coram nobis, on
the other hand, was said to be proper where the deprivations were not
12

Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 66 S.Ct. 116 (1945).
Hawk v. Olson, (D.C. Neb. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 195 at 202. See also Hawk
v. O'Grady, 137 Neb. 639, 290 N.W. 911 (1940); 56 YALE L.J. 574 (1947).
14
Thompson v. Nierstheimer, 395 Ill. 572, 71 N.E. (2d) 343 (1947); Barrett v. Bradley, 391 Ill. 169, 62 N.E. (2d) 788 (1945).
15
Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 at 565, 68 S.Ct. 240 (1947).
16
!cl. at 566; see also Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S.211, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946).
17
See People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19 at 26, 72 N.E. (2d) 827 (1947); Sims v.
People, 399 Ill. 159, 77 N.E. (2d) 173 (1948). A similar situation exists in Indiana
where a narrow habeas corpu's procedure is not available as a means of asserting deprivation of due process, and the coram nobis remedy is crippled by a five year statute of
limitations. See 22 IND. L.J. 189, 390 (1947).
18
332 U.S. 561, 68 S.Ct. 240 (1947). After the reversal of the state circuit
court, Attorney General Barrett of Illinois contended that Marino should be ordered
released immediately. This contention was denied by the state circuit court, and the
United States Supreme Court denied a request for instructions to this effect. Marino
v. Ragen, (U.S. 1948) 68 S.Ct. 729. Then, upon hearing, the state circuit court judge
found that Marino bad not been deprived of his constitutional rights, and quashed
the writ of habeas corpus. CHICAGO TRIBUNE, April 4, 1948, 41 :3.
13
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within the knowledge of the trial judge at the time of the trial.19 The
effect of a five year statute of limitations on coram nobis in Illinois ha,s
been confused by Woods v. Nier-stheimer 20 in which the United States
Supreme Court held that the petitioner must exhaust his state remedy of
coram nobis even though the statute of limitations had already run.
The Court evidently felt that the Illinois Supreme Court must first
say that the plain words of the statute applied to this case before the
federal courts would exercise their jurisdiction. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit later pointed out in Rooney v. Ragen 2 1
that the Supreme Court must have overlooked People v. Rave,22 in
which the Illinois Supreme Court held that the five year limitation is
applicable to all coram nobis proceedings, including those alleging
deprivation of due process.
This confusion of remedie\ for all practical purposes eliminates the
petitioner's chances for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. The Court has refused to grant the writ in cases where
the state court's denial of a hearing can be based on limitations under
state law on remedial procedure.23 Since the state court's denials of
hearing are almost invariably without opinion, and the status of the
remedies is uncertain, the United States Supreme Court has taken the
position, in most cases,. that it cannot say that the decision was not based
on such procedural grounds, and it has therefore denied certiorari.u
This weakness in the remediaJ system of certain states has been attacked by the federal courts, legal writers, and also by the Attorney
General of Illinois.25 It would be well to consider the possible sources
of a solution, and the forms it may take.

C. Possible Solutions to Inadequacies of State Remedial Procedure
r. State reform. The soundest solution to the problem of securing these basic constitutional rights would, of course, be wise and
.vigorous state reform to eliminate the procedural impasse and provide
19 See the quotation taken from the Illinois Attorney GeneraFs remarks in Marino
v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 at 566, 68 S.Ct. 240 (1947); see also Justice Rutledge's
commentary on the Illinois procedure in concurring opini<;>n at 56-3.
20
328 U.S. 2II, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946).
21 (C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 158 F. (2d) 346.
22
392 Ill. 435, 65 N.E. (2d) 23 (1946) •
• 23 Of 322 petitions for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court alleging a
denial of post-conviction hearing, only two were granted during the l 946 term.
Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 at 563, 68 S.Ct. _240 (1947).
24 See footnote 4 to Justice Rutledge's concurring opinion in Marino v. Ragen,
332 U.S. 561 at 565, 68 S.Ct. 240 (1947).
26 "George F. Barrett, Illinois Attorney General, issued a statement declaring
Marino had suffered 'a flagrant violation of his constitutional rights,' and admitted
that the Illinois law needed clarification." NEW YoRK TIMES, December 23, 1947
20:4; see note 18, supra.
·
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a practical, simple, and efficient post-conviction remedy. This could
best be done by the creation of a statutory remedy under which the prisoner could assert deprivation of due process as to matters in the record
or outside of it. Such a remedy should be without time limitation and
should be allowed in forma pauperis. In some states a remedy might be
developed by clear and consistent definition of the scope of present common law and statutory procedures by the state supreme courts.
State reform would have the advantage of fitting the remedy to
the particular court system of the state, and of permitting the special
use of less burdened courts. 26 State reform would also be an assumption by the states of their proper function, and would allow them to
maintain control of the administration of criminal justice without criticism or interference.27 One needed reform lies easily within the-power
of the state courts. By indicating clearly when dismissal of a prisoner's
petition is on the merits, the state courts could eliminate the problem
faced by the petitioner in the United States Supreme Court where it
is usually presumed that the state dismissal was on procedural
grounds.28 The scope of this comment does not include the additional
problems that may spring from an inadequately constituted court system. 20 •
2. A more readily available remedy in the federal courts. •The
right to procedural due process is clearly a federal right, and as such
must ultimately be protected by the federal government. Although the
federal courts have ample jurisdiction to grant writs of habeas corpus
to persons imprisoned in violation of cons~itutional rights,8° they have
long conformed to a self imposed limitation on this jurisdiction.81_ In
Ex parte Hawk, the United States Supreme Court said:
26
For example, Illinois might provide for original hearings or more complete
review in the intermediate appellate courts without deluging the overburdened Illinois
Supreme Court. Compare the unique coram nobis procedure used in Hysler v. Florida,
315 U.S. 411 at 415, 62 S.Ct. 688 (1942).
27
"Upon the state courts, equally with the Courts of the Union, rests the obligation to guard and enforce every right secu!ed by that Constitution." Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 at 113, 55 S.Ct. 340 (1935). In that case the Court
rejected the idea that the state courts had no duty to provide for. post-conviction
hearings.
28
Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211 at 214, o6 S.Ct. 996 (1946). See
also Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471 at 477, 65 S.Ct. 363 (1945).
_
29
See, "A Study of The Illinois Supre~e Court," 15 UNiv. CHI. L. REV. 107
at 163 (1947).
80
U.S. Rev. Stat. (1878) § 753, 28 U.S.C. (1946) § 453.
81
"While the power to issue writs of habeas corpus under Rev. Stat. sec. 753,
nominally extends to every case where a party 'is in custody in violation of the
Constitution •.•,' it is not every such case where the interference of the federal court
is demanded, particularly where the state court is executing its own criminal laws.•••
Ordinarily an error in this particular can be better corrected by this court upon a
writ of error to the highest court of the State than by an interference, which is never
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"Ordinarily an application for habeas corpus by one detained
under a state court judgment of conviction for crime will be entertained by a federal court only after all state remedies available,
including all appellate remedies in the state courts and in this
Court by appeal or writ of certiorari, have been exhausted. [ Citing cases.] And where those remedies have been exhausted this
Court will not ordinarily entertain an application for the writ
. before it has been sought and denied in a district court or denied
by a circuit or district judge." 82
The Supreme Court has left an opening for the federal courts in
cases where the state remedy "proves in practice unavailable or seriously inadequate," 88 but in practical application the rule has been of
little value to the petitioner. In the Jast petition of Henry Hawk to
the federal district court, the judge held that the United States Supreme Court decisions compelled him to send Hawk back to try another state remedy of questionable adequacy.8 ,l The federal courts
· generally have believed that the doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies should be used to close the doors of the district courts to such applicants; within limits it seems that the doctrine ought to be so used. From
neither a th_eoretical nor a practical standpoint should the federal courts
estaolish themselves .as the sole safeguard of constitutional liberty.85
Yet stringent insistence upon the exhaustion of state remedies which
are often equivocal seems an unnecessary ~nd improper refusal by the
federal courts to consider questions directly concerning basic federal
rights. Justice Rutledge, in his separate concurring opinion in Marino
v. Ragen,86 clearly pointed out the futility of requiring a petitioner to
pursue uncertain remedies, and said that petitioners in Illinois should
no longer be required to exhaust state remedies before applying to
federal district courts.87
less than unpleasant, with the procedure of the state courts before the petitioner has
exhausted his remedy there," Brown, J., in Davis v. Burke, 179 U.S. 399 at 4oz, ZI
S.Ct. zIO (1900). See also Urquhart v. Brown, zo5 U.S. 179, 27 S.Ct. 459 (1907);
Ex parte Royall, II7 U.S. z41, 6 S.Ct. 734 (1886).
32
321 U.S. II4 at u6, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944).
83
Id. at II 8.
H Hawk v. Olson, (D.C. Neb. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 195 at 199.
85
"State courts are no less under duty to observe the United States Constitution
than is this Court. To be sure, authority is vested in this Court to see to it that that
duty is observed. But to assume disobedience instead of obedience to the Law of the
Land by the highest courts of the states is to engender friction between the federal and
state judicial systems, to weaken the authority of the state courts and the administration of state laws by encouraging unmeritorious resorts to this Court, and wa_stefully
to swell the dockets of this Court," Frankfurter, J., dissenting in Williams v. Kaiser,
323 U.S. 471 at 482, 65 S.Ct. 363 (1945).
86
33z U.S. 561 at 563, 68 S. Ct. 240 (1947).
.
87
Rutledge, J., concurring in Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 at 570, 68 S.Ct.
240 (1947). It is unlikely, however, that the federal district judges in Illinois will
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The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, has
recently considered the question of exhaustion of remedies in a more realistic manner. In Potter v. Dowd, 38 the court held that the writ should
be granted although the petitioner had done no more than apply once
for coram nobis in Indiana. In a split decision the court reversed its
previous stand requiring exhaustion of the state habeas corpus procedure which the state court had repeatedly held available only to
question jurisdiction of the court over the person and the subject matter. The court also held that appeal from a denial of hearing on coram
nobis need not be taken since state practice did not allow the indigent
prisoner to proceed in forma pauperis.89 In Rooney v. Ragen,4° the
same court disregarded the case of Woods v. NierstheimerH which required a petiticmer to· exhaust a state remedy already barred by the
statute of limitations. Rooney was therefore given a hearing after his
exhaustion of the state habeas corpus procedure. It mu~t be recognized,
however, that the abuse of habeas corpus by petitioners with unfounded
claims will induce federal judges to use the available precedents as a
bar to the worthy as well as the unworthy petitioner. A:t the present
time, the value of the writ of habeas corpus to the state prisoner seems
to depend largely on whether the federal judge will consider "availability" and "adequacy" in the sense of practical efficacy of the remedy
in obtaining a hearing, or as a convenient means to avoid unwelcome
duties.
3. Reform by federal legislation. The doctrine of exhaustion of
state remedies becomes especially significant with the recent enactment
by Congress of the revision of the Judicial Code,42 embodying a codification of the rule of Ex Parte Hawk. 48 A proposed modification of
this revision would allow the application for a writ of habeas corpus in
federal courts if there is no plain, speedy, and efficient remedy available in the state courts as comprehensive and e:ffective as the writ of
be more inclined to assume the burden of hearing all the habeas corpus proceedings
brought in Illinois. Under the present limitations on federal jurisdiction, 293 petitions for writs of habeas corpus were filed in the federal courts of the seventh circuit
(Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin) for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1947. Annual
Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, table
C 3, II3 (1948). In the 1946 term of the United States Supreme Court, 322 petition$ for certiorari or appeal were filed in f orma pauperis by Illinois prisoners. Marino
v. Ragen, id. at 563.
38
(C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 244.
39
Id. at 246.
40
(C.C.A. 7th, 1946) 158 F. (2d) 346.
41
328 U.S. 211, 66 S.Ct. 996 (1946).
42
Public Law 773, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948). See §-2254. Judge Parker
of the United States Circuit Court for the Fourth Circuit comments favorably on the
revison in "Limiting the Abuse of Habeas Corpus," 8 FED. RuLES DEc. 171 (1948).
48
321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448 (1944).

80
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habeas corpus in the federal court.44 This would solve the problem of
the petitioner in a state with unsatisfactory remedies, but the suggested
legislation would also impose a tremendous burden on the federal
district courts in such a state.
The recommendations of the Judicial Conference of s·enior Circuit
Judges are clearly opposed to any extension of jurisdiction in habeas
corpus proceedings.45 They would require exhaustion of all available
remedies, unless exceptional circumstances render the procedures ineffective. Such an amendment would amount to little more than a
clarification of the language of Ex parte Hawk. It clearly would not
extend the federal remedy to any petitioner who has not exhausted all
his remedies as required by the present practice. .fo.. clear departure from
a doctrine of exhaustion of state remedies would not only appear shocking to those accustomed to traditional thinking concerning the relation
between federal and state courts, but would create serious burdens on
the federal courts.46 However, some change would clearly be desirable to eliminate the necessity of exhausting purely fictional remedies.
·

D. Conclusion
Any review of post-conviction remedies compels a realization of the
serious difficulties facing a prisoner who has been convicted in unconstitutional proceedings. Although solution on the state level is the
most satisfactory answer, the federal courts should not be prevented by
44
The suggested amendment is similar to the Johnson Act dealing with the jurisdiction of the federal courts to enjoin state rate schedules. 28 U.S.C. (1946) § 41 (1).
See Driscoll v. Edison Light and Power Co., 307 U.S. 104, 59 S.Ct. 831 (1939).
The suggested modification is supported by Frank, "The United States Supreme
Court, 1946-47," 15 UN1v. CHI. L. REv. I at 28 (1947); and Fraenkel, "The
Function of the Lower Federal Courts as Protectors of Civil Liberties," 13 LAw AND
CoNTEM, PROB, 132 at 136 (1948).
45
See Report of the Judicial Conference, 92 L. Ed. 125 at 134 (1947).
46 What is probably the attitude of many federal judges is expressed by Judge
Goodman in "The Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus," 7 F.R.D. 313
( l 948) ". . • the great writ [ of habeas corpus] has been one of the staunch safeguards of liberty. The last few years have seen the right to its use become a penitentiary racket!" Id. at 3 I 6.
But compare the language of Circuit Judge Evans: ."Enforcement or protection
of the rights of an individual is surely not adequate if it turns on the amount or
increase of the judicial labors in the federal courts.••. Legislation may be required
to relieve the -burden of the courts, and yet insure protection to the various prisoners
who present grievances ••. through the establishment of a separate quasi-judicial body
or a separate court." Potter v. Dowd, (C.C.A. 7th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 244 at 249.
The traditional arguments against assumption of jurisdiction by the federal courts are
raised by Major, J., in his dissenting opinion in the same case. Id. at 250.
For a very recent Supreme Court decision dealing with the matter of repeated
applications for the writ, see Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, (1948);
·
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equivocal state procedures from vindicating the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution of the United States. A realistic solution would seem
to be a careful assessment by federal district judges of the adequacy in
fact of state remedies, with a view to the actual possibility of securing
a hearing on the merits and with less concern for the judicial labors
of_ the federal courts. A revision of the Judicial Code that would make
this duty clear would be welcome.
David H. Armstrong, S.Ed.

